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Abstract 
Although there is an extensive literature on domestic legal transplants, far less is 
known about the transplantation of supranational judicial bodies. The Andean 
Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) is one of eleven copies of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), and the third most active international court. This article considers the 
origins and evolution of the ATJ as a transplanted judicial institution. It first reviews 
the literatures on legal transplants, neofunctionalist theory, and the spread of 
European ideas and institutions, explaining how the intersection of these literatures 
informs the study of supranational judicial transplants. 
The article next explains why the Andean Pact's member states decided to add a 
court to their regional integration initiative, why they adapted the European 
Community model, and how the ECJ's existence has shaped the evolution of 
Andean legal doctrine and the political space within which the ATJ operates. We 
conclude by analyzing how the ATJ's experience informs the challenges of 
supranational transplants and theories of supranational legal integration more 
generally. 
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In the 1950s, in the wake of a devastating world war, European countries began a 
process of pooling sovereignty to collectively rebuild their security and economies. 
This process, which involved the creation of supranational institutions to promote 
economic, legal and political integration, soon attracted new adherents. Beginning 
in the 1960s, other governments around the world emulated Europe’s model of 
regional integration, proposing common markets and copying the institutions of the 
European Community (EC).  
The EC from its inception included a court of justice, but early replications of 
European integration did not.1 Although these regional integration projects did not 
live up to the aspirations of their proponents, few attributed their failure to the lack 
of supranational judicial bodies. Rather, scholars stressed the absence of economic 
and political preconditions required for regional integration to succeed (Schmitter 
1970, Nye 1971, Mattli 1999). 
The inattention given to supranational judicial systems in the 1960s and early 
1970s reflected the limited role that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) played in 
advancing European integration. The ECJ made doctrinally important rulings during 
these years,2 but it refrained from applying those rulings in ways that provoked 
political controversy. As a result, ECJ case law was of greater doctrinal than political 
significance (Alter 1998).  
Politicians, practitioners, and scholars began to pay more attention to the ECJ in the 
late 1970s, when the court began to dismantle national barriers to the free 
movement of goods, capital, labor, and services. These actors came to view the ECJ 
as an engine for helping to overcome political blockages and build integration 
through law (Weiler 1991, Maduro 1998, Stone Sweet 2004, Cichowski 2007). 
Observers also credited the ECJ’s alliance with national courts with increasing 
respect by member states for for EC rules and with coordinating interpretations of 
common EC rules across borders (Weiler 1991, p 2424-31, See also Alter 1998). 
When critics began to question the EC’s political accountability and democratic 
legitimacy, the court’s proponents responded by citing the ECJ’s key role in 
upholding the rule of law. The court ensured that Europe’s supranational 
administrative institutions faced legal checks, just as did domestic administrative 
actors (Alter 2001, especially 87-117). And the court’s review of the validity of EC 
legislation further bolstered the accountability of European institutions, even if 
some claimed that the ECJ was biased in favor of community over state interests 
(Hartley 1996).  
The increasingly important role of the ECJ in promoting European integration 
eventually led other regional integration systems to establish their own 
supranational courts. The Andean Pact (later renamed the Andean Community) was 
one of the first such systems to create a court.3 In 1969, five countries on the 
western edge of South America imported from Europe the idea of building a 
regional common market. The Andean Pact envisioned community legislation that 
would be directly applicable within member states, but it lacked a judicial body to 
interpret or help enforce those rules. By the late 1970s, member governments 
began to draft a treaty to create a supranational court. In 1984 they created the 
Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ or the Tribunal), explicitly modeling its design on 
the ECJ. Initially the ATJ received few cases, but over time its docket has grown to 
                                                 
1 The Benelux system is a partial exception. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg created a 
customs union in 1947, without a court. When all three countries joined the EC, they continued their 
union which to this day coordinates regulation in areas not covered by the EC. In 1965 member states 
adopted the treaty establishing a Benelux Court of Justice, although the court was not created until 
1975. The Benelux Court is today an adjunct to the ECJ, conducting review with respect to BENLUX 
countries that are not also EC members. 
2 Indeed, Joseph Weiler considers the 1960s and 1970s to be a “foundational period” during which the 
ECJ transformed the Treaty of Rome into a constitution and closed state “exit” from EC law (Weiler 
1991, p. 2424-31).  
3 See Note 1. 
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the point that the ATJ is the third most active international court today (after the 
ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights).4 
In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War, the rise of the Washington Consensus,5 and 
the creation of the World Trade Organization spawned a new wave of regional 
integration (Romano 1999, Alter 2011a). This second generation incorporated 
supranational judicial institutions that had proven so important to advancing 
integration in Europe. There are now at least ten copies of the ECJ, each of which 
replicates two key features that commentators agree have been critical to the ECJ’s 
success: a noncompliance procedure that authorizes the secretariat, member 
states, and sometimes private litigants to challenge national policies that conflict 
with community rules; and a preliminary reference mechanism that allows, and 
sometimes requires, national courts to suspend legal proceedings and send 
questions of interpretation to the supranational court.6  
Transplanting European laws and legal institutions around the world is hardly a new 
phenomenon. Many legal systems incorporate transplants from France, Britain, 
Germany, Spain or the Scandinavian countries (Berkowitz et al. 2003, p. 163-7). 
This paper explores a different and understudied issue—the consequences of 
copying a European supranational judicial institution. Specifically, we ask two 
related questions: how did the existence of the ECJ influence the founding of the 
ATJ, and how, if at all, has the ECJ’s experience—its doctrinal innovations and the 
responses of litigants and governments to watershed rulings—shaped the ATJ’s 
trajectory? 
Section I summarizes and synthesizes the literature on legal transplants, regional 
integration, and the diffusion of ideas to provide a framework to examine how 
transplanting supranational judicial institutions shapes the trajectory of the 
transplanted copies. Section II explains why Andean Community member states 
decided to emulate the ECJ, and it investigates adaptations that Andean leaders 
made as they considered the ECJ’s track record. Section III builds upon a previous 
study of the ATJ’s preliminary rulings to develop insights about how the ECJ’s 
trajectory did and did not influence the development of Andean legal doctrine and 
the political space within which the ATJ operates.  
Section IV investigates a broader issue: what the ATJ’s experience tells us about 
supranational courts and supranational integration efforts more generally. First, 
theories of supranational judicial systems have yet to take into account of insights 
from the literature analyzing the challenges of transplanting national laws and 
institutions. Our study of the ATJ leads us to hypothesize that mimicry is the 
principal mode through which the ECJ model is diffused. In particular, Andean 
Community actors emulate ECJ practices only when and to the extent they see ECJ 
practices as helpful to achieve their collective goals. As a result, copying is selective 
rather than wholesale. The more general insight is that even when supranational 
                                                 
4 Statistics on the number of decisions issued by international courts up to the end 2009 include the 
following: ECJ (13,377); European Court of Human Rights (10,659); ATJ (1,786); GATT/WTO (370); 
Organization for the Harmonization of African Law (358); and Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(152). See Alter 2013, and for earlier statistics, see Alter 2010. 
5 The “Washington Consensus” was the term coined by John Williamson to encompass a package of 
reforms advocated by a set of Washington based institutions (e.g. the US Treasury and the International 
Monetary Fund). Originally the term applied to a specific set of policies, but now it is used to denote the 
neoliberal economic reform agenda of pro-market economists and policy-makers. See: (Williamson 
1990). 
6 Ten ICs copy both design features from the ECJ albeit with some variations: The Benelux court, Andean 
Tribunal of Justice, European Free Trade Area Court, West African Economic and Monetary Union Court, 
Common Market for East African States Court, Central African Monetary Community Court, East African 
Community Court, Caribbean Court of Justice, Court of Justice of the Community of West African States, 
and the Southern African Development Community Court. The Common Court of Justice and Arbitration 
of the Organization for the Harmonization of African law and the Central American Court of Justice have 
preliminary ruling mechanisms.  There are proposals to convert existing ICs of the Caribbean Community 
and the Economic Community of the Commonwealth of Independent States into ECJ style ICs. And the 
proposed Court of the African Mahgreb is modeled on the ECJ. For more, see: (Alter 2011b). 
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courts are modeled on the ECJ and expressly incorporate ECJ doctrines, they 
develop and apply those doctrines differently by adapting them to the distinctive 
legal and political contexts in which they are embedded. These adaptations in 
themselves may be key for successful transplantation. 
Second, we find that copying brings tangible benefits that exist in large part 
because the Andean Community is modeled on its European predecessor. The EC’s 
experience provides useful information to Andean decision-makers considering how 
to respond to new situations and controversies. The EC also provides legal and 
technical expertise, financial support, access to a network of legal and other 
experts, and encouragement to ATJ judges and Andean officials to develop their 
jurisprudence and political authority. These forms of assistance are especially 
helpful because most ECJ transplants exist in regions whose member states are 
short on material and political resources.  
Third, the ATJ’s distinctive trajectory has implications for theories of supranational 
legal integration, especially neofunctionalist theory. The ATJ has the same design 
features as the ECJ, and it could have adopted a teleological interpretation of the 
ambitious goals in the Andean Pact’s founding treaties and actively solicited support 
from national judges and private litigants to build regional integration through law. 
As we explain elsewhere, however (Helfer et al. 2009, Alter and Helfer 2010), the 
ATJ has not emulated the ECJ’s penchant for expansionist judicial lawmaking, nor 
has it sought to create national-level demand for judicial enforcement of community 
rules. The Tribunal has instead allowed member states to set the pace and scope of 
integration via Andean secondary legislation. According to longstanding ATJ 
doctrine, the more extensively states collectively legislate, and the more detailed 
that legislation, the more sovereignty they transfer to the community level. Thus, 
contrary to neofunctionalist theory, the ATJ has required an initial top-down 
expression of political support before it will circumscribe the power of national 
governments in response to requests by private litigants.  
1. Transplanting, Emulating, Appropriating: The Diffusion of Supranational 
Legal Institutions 
How do institutions diffuse around the world? When do borrowed institutions thrive 
in new contexts? These questions have long interested practitioners and scholars.7 
This section summarizes and synthesizes three distinct lines of scholarship that 
focus on the legal dimensions of the diffusion question—literatures on legal 
transplants, neofunctionalist theory, and the spread of European ideas and 
institutions—whose previously unexplored intersection helps to understand the 
ECJ’s influence on the ATJ.  
1.1. Insights from the Literature on Legal Transplants 
Legal transplants have a long lineage dating back at least as far as the Roman 
empire. The concept of a “legal transplant” is primarily a metaphor (Nelken 2001). 
In medicine, transplants replace damaged body parts, with the hope that the body 
will be fooled into thinking the transplant is original. For legal transplants, in 
contrast, the foreign nature of the transplant is often precisely the attraction. Legal 
transplants are designed to emulate best practices or to import “foreignness” into a 
context where actors who favor importation have lost confidence in existing laws 
and institutions.  
Scholars who study transplants recognize that the transplant analogy is flawed in 
another way (Legrand 2001). Nearly all contemporary legal systems consist of 
some amalgam of indigenously generated laws, imported legal traditions, and laws 
                                                 
7 The literature is vast. According to one study, over 400 articles on policy diffusion were published 
between 1998 and 2008, just in the discipline of political science. For stock taking on this literature see: 
(Jacoby 2006, Graham et al. 2008). 
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and institutions that emulate global practices or practices in other countries. As a 
result, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish transplanted from homegrown laws 
and legal systems.  
Commentators are also troubled by the claim that transplanting foreign institutions 
improves local practices, an idea that tends to be associated with colonialism and 
imperialism. In the 19th century, European governments transplanted their 
institutions to help “civilize” the populations they colonized. Following World War II, 
the United States transplanted its own institutions around the world, including 
constitutional courts, elections, business associations, and multiparty political 
systems (See for example Jacoby 2000). The end of the Cold War ushered in a 
period of economic liberalism and a renewed enthusiasm for legal transplants by 
international institutions (Berkowitz et al. 2003, p. 163-7). This latest penchant for 
exporting model laws and institutions was especially controversial to the extent that 
its proponents asserted the superiority of the Western industrial model of market 
regulation and the common law model of national legal systems (La Porta et al. 
1997, La Porta et al. 1998).  
Notwithstanding persistent critiques, scholars and policymakers continue to explore 
when and how transplanting laws and legal institutions changes the behavior and 
politics of the actors at the site of the transplant. Their studies suggest a number of 
conclusions. First, legal transplants are more likely to succeed when law is 
transplanted within the same legal family because, as Alan Watson explains, the 
success of a transplant will depend on its ability to graft onto existing legal norms 
and practices (Watson 1976).  
Second, transplants not adapted to local contexts are unlikely to be effective. 
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharnia Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard argue that legal 
transplants succeed only where they respond to local demand and where they are 
adapted to local needs. In the absence of these conditions, the authors observe a 
“transplant effect”—a formal copying of rules that creates a “mismatch between 
preexisting conditions and institutions and the transplanted law, which weakens the 
effectiveness of the imported legal order.” (Berkowitz et al. 2003, p. 171) Their key 
insight is that, in the absence of local demand and adaptation, transplanted legal 
rules and institutions that look the same on paper are largely ignored in practice.  
Third, the act of creating and diffusing transplants may itself shape understandings 
of the transplant such that what is actually transplanted is not a true copy but 
instead reflects the normative preferences of transplant advocates. The original 
laws and institutions are revised through conversations about the rationales for and 
objectives of the transplant. As a result, imported legal rules are recast through 
selected invocations and stylized interpretations of the original (Graziadei 2009, p. 
737).8 
These insights about legal transplants apply to supranational transplants in 
distinctive ways. For example, the finding about legal families helps to explain why 
common market systems are especially likely to emulate the ECJ. Architects of 
international legal systems select from a menu of existing laws and institutions. For 
international economic law, there are two dominant models: the dispute resolution 
system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became 
transformed into that of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the ECJ’s 
supranational judicial system. The WTO model relies on states to file complaints, 
which are reviewed by ad hoc panels whose decisions may be appealed to a 
standing appellate body. The WTO also uses a system of reciprocal sanctions to 
enforce these decisions. States that prove violations of WTO obligations can apply 
trade sanctions, usually by raising tariffs on imports from the violating country, as a 
                                                 
8 Frances Foster argues that conversations about transplants end up being informative for exporting as 
well as importing countries, since they serve as a “mirror” that the exporting state can hold up for self-
scrutiny. (Foster 2010, p. 621).  
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form of compensation and to induce compliance. In contrast, the EC model has four 
distinctive features not found in the WTO system:  
1. Directly applicable community legal rules. Supranational legislative bodies 
create secondary legal rules, granting rights and imposing obligations on 
private parties and public bodies, that are directly applicable in domestic 
legal orders.  
2. A preliminary ruling mechanism. National judges refer to the supranational 
court questions of interpretation regarding community rules. National courts 
of last instance are required to refer cases.  
3. Private parties may challenge the validity of decisions and actions of 
supranational legislative and political institutions. Both private actors and 
states can challenge supranational administrative decisions and legal rules 
that directly affect them. 
4. Noncompliance procedures allow nonstate actors to challenge state actions 
that violate community rules. A supranational body is empowered to 
investigate allegations of noncompliance and file complaints with the 
supranational court.  
ECJ transplants need not need copy all four of these design features. Rather, they 
can selectively choose features from both the ECJ and WTO models.9 Most ECJ 
emulators in fact copy at least three of these features, albeit with some 
variations.10 As we explain below, the ATJ includes all four features, adds a WTO-
like system of reciprocal sanctions, and includes other adaptations of the ECJ’s 
design.  
We take from this literature the following lines of inquiry. First, we focus on the 
channels, agents, and mechanisms involved in diffusing the EC model. Second, we 
explain how the ECJ’s experience shaped adaptations of the model in the Andean 
context. Third, we build upon this analysis to explore the limitations and challenges 
of supranational legal transplants in general. Before turning to this analysis, we first 
review how the legal transplants literature intersects with theoretical debates about 
the dynamics of legal integration and the transformative nature of the ideas that 
animated integration in Europe.  
1.2. Neofunctionalist Theory, Supranational Integration, and Legal Transplants 
The success of the European integration project led early supporters to develop 
neofunctionalism, an institution-based political process theory applicable to all 
regional integration efforts. Proponents believed that supranational institutions 
would forge alliances with sub-state actors to address common functional problems 
whose solution would propel integration forward. In the 1960s, adherents of 
neofunctionalism predicted that regional integration would become a global 
phenomenon. Ernst Haas, the theory’s most prominent advocate, recognized that 
the success of European integration was unusual in that EC member countries were 
economically advanced and ideologically similar. But he and other neofunctionalists 
nonetheless expected regional integration processes to develop elsewhere in the 
world and to result in similar economic and political outcomes (Haas, 1961, Haas, 
1970).  
By the 1970s, however, neofunctionalists had thoroughly repudiated their theory 
and candidly acknowledged its many shortcomings. First, neofunctionalist theory 
did not predict the trajectory of regional integration in other locales. Second, even 
in Europe the theory did not apply as expected. The dynamism of the integration 
process proved to be fragile and subject to political turbulences that derailed 
                                                 
9 The notion that importers ‘order from a menu’ comes from: (Jacoby 2004). 
10 For example, some ECJ emulators have adapted the ECJ model to protect national sovereignty or to 
increase international oversight of domestic actors. See (Alter 2011b). 
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forward momentum. The sharp discrepancies between theoretical predictions and 
empirical reality led Haas to declare neofunctionalism to be “obsolecent” (Haas 
1975). Ever since, most political scientists have shied away from invoking the 
theory (Caporaso and Keeler 1995). 
Neofunctionalism is, however, very much alive as a theory of legal integration. The 
theory was resurrected by Anne-Marie Slaughter (then Burley) and Walter Mattli, 
who argued that Haas had accurately predicted how legal (rather than political) 
integration institutions evolve (Burley and Mattli 1993). Slaughter and Mattli 
observed that the structure of the European legal system allowed legal integration 
to proceed via alliances between supranational and sub-national actors who worked 
together to promote their mutual self-interest. The authors also predicted that EC 
law would inevitably spill into new legal domains as litigants realized that ECJ 
precedents could apply to a broad range of issues. Slaughter and Mattli argued that 
law could more easily be shielded from political turbulence, and they observed that 
the ECJ frequently sought to “upgrade the common interest” by linking individual 
cases to larger objectives. In short, the expansion and penetration of supranational 
law into national legal orders advanced following the political dynamics Haas 
expected: alliances between supranational and subnational actors, spillovers, and 
the enhancement of common interests. 
Alec Stone Sweet later extended these insights, connecting neofunctionalism to a 
theory of how international courts contribute to the creation of law. Stone Sweet 
argued that a general dynamic emerges in the presence of economic rules that 
promote intra-community trade and a legal system to which self-interested litigants 
have access. Where these conditions exist, economic self-interest leads litigants to 
invoke international economic law before international judicial bodies. Since law is 
inevitably incomplete, courts will be drawn into developing it. The result is the 
construction of new legal rules, which lead to new cases, which create additional 
opportunities for litigation and law expansion. Stone Sweet’s theory does not 
require embracing the teleology advanced by Haas; politicians can change legal 
rules and thereby redirect the integration process. But it suggests that such 
interventions will be rare and that courts will, over time, expand the scope and 
reach of the law (Stone Sweet 1999, Stone Sweet 2010).  
Stone Sweet sees law, trade, and litigation as creating virtuous circles of law 
generation. But the relationship among these three elements is unclear. In 
particular, it is unclear whether bottom-up economic interests generate demand for 
international legal rules—so that both governments and courts primarily respond to 
the self-interest of firms—or, conversely, whether a top-down political commitment 
to integration drives firms to invest in cross-border production and trade and to 
litigate when rules are ambiguous.11 The issue of whether bottom-up demand or 
top-down policy choices drive the legal integration process goes to the heart of the 
debates about legal transplants. The transplant literature suggests that importing 
foreign laws and institutions is insufficient to stimulate local demand, signal a 
credible government commitment, or give domestic actors a stake in implementing 
or enforcing legal rules. To the contrary, the transplanted nature of foreign laws 
and institutions—especially those seen as externally imposed—may signal that 
national political commitment is lacking.  
The legal transplants literature thus hones in on a key challenge that derailed Haas’ 
neofunctionalist political theory: how to create local demand for transplanted 
institutions and laws. Neofunctionalism cannot answer this question because it is 
                                                 
11 Stone Sweet’s work includes a number of caveats—factors that limit judicial discretion (Stone Sweet 
2004, p. 23-30)—but he is ultimately unable to untangle the relationship between laws, trade and 
litigation, since in Europe they rose in tandem with each other (Ibid, p. 55-92). Pitarakis and Tridimas 
reanalyze Stone Sweet’s data, finding support for the conclusion that international legal rules lead to 
trade, suggesting that political factors drive economic decisions rather than visa versa. Studies of the 
WTO also reach this conclusion. (Pitarakis and Tridimas 2003, Goldstein et al. 2007). 
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premised on the same assumption that guided policy-oriented enthusiasts of legal 
transplants during the period of the Washington Consensus. Even if one sheds the 
teleology of early neofunctionalism, the theory retains an expectation that 
transplanted free market rules and institutions will trigger economic actors to trade, 
invest, and litigate. Mattli, Slaughter, and Stone Sweet added a legal dimension to 
this equation, drawing attention to the importance of litigation as a tool for spurring 
market-integrating lawmaking and judicial precedent as a mechanism of policy 
spillover. But self-interest remains the underspecified engine of the theoretical 
apparatus. It is far from clear, however, why local litigants, scholars, and judges 
will embrace transplanted rules, let alone view their respective self-interests as 
aligning with regional integration initiatives. 
1.3. Legal Transplants and the Diffusion of European Ideas  
Supranational transplants also provide evidence to assess theories of how ideas, 
policies, and institutions diffuse across borders. Scholars who promulgate such 
theories are interested in the mechanisms of diffusion and the associated 
transformation of politics and identities. Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse identify five 
mechanisms: (1) exporters of ideas, policies, and institutions can use legal, 
economic or physical coercion; (2) exporters can manipulate the utility calculations 
of political elites, for example by conferring or withholding inducements; (3) 
exporters can socialize importers, dispersing their ideas and institutions via 
normative pressure such that local actors internalize an authoritative model; (4) 
supporters of external ideas and institutions can use persuasion, providing 
reasoned arguments that convince local actors to accept exported models; and (5) 
adopters may emulate either by drawing lessons for themselves, mimicking foreign 
models to reap benefits or to send a signal to external and internal actors (Börzel 
and Risse 2009).  
Risse and Börzel are primarily interested in the role of the EU in exporting ideas. 
They suggest, however, that each diffusion mechanism shapes the extent to which 
the foreign import becomes domestically entrenched.12 For example, Börzel and 
Risse expect persuasion and socialization to have the greatest potential to 
meaningfully transform the identities and interests of recipients. They see mimicry 
as reflecting an indirect influence by the ideational exporter and assert that political 
scientists know very little about how emulation works in practice.  
This is where the legal transplants literature may be of some help. Berkowitz, 
Pistor, and Richard argue that the way in which the local recipient receives the law 
will determine the success of the legal transplant. They expect that “a voluntary 
transplant increases its own receptivity when it makes a significant adaptation of 
the foreign [model] to initial conditions, in particular to the preexisting formal and 
informal legal order. Changes in the transplanted rules or legal institutions indicate 
that the appropriateness of these rules has been considered and modifications were 
made to take into account domestic legal practice of other initial conditions” 
(Berkowitz et al. 2003, p 179). In other words, blind mimicry, or copying inspired 
by coercion and inducement, is likely to generate a “transplant effect” in which 
those expected to use the transplant may resist transplanted ideas and institutions. 
In contrast, the existence of local adaptations may be a sign that importers are 
considering local needs and making adjustments to increase the likelihood of the 
transplant’s success. 
We found no evidence that EC officials used coercion or inducements to influence 
local actors to adopt a supranational court. This leaves three potential mechanisms 
of institutional diffusion—socialization, persuasion, and some form of mimicry. If a 
community legal system is a product of socialization of local elites, then we should 
                                                 
12 The mechanisms are also relevant to testing the claims of neofunctionalist theory. For example, if 
mimicry were the dominant mode of transplantation, it would cast doubt on whether there is any 
inherent logic of integration that arises when other regions copy the European model.  
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observe a higher incidence of emulation among those actors who have more 
contact with their European counterparts. The question then becomes whether or 
not this socialization penetrates the local context, and thus whether institutional 
diffusion via socialization of elites gives rise to a transplant effect. Alternatively, if 
persuasion is the mechanism of diffusion, we should observe importers invoking the 
persuasive value of European law in promoting integration through law. To the 
extent that local actors are also persuaded, we might not observe a transplant 
effect. Finally, mimicry has multiple forms that yield contrasting expectations. Blind 
mimicry, where there is no effort to adapt the model to the local context, is likely to 
give rise to a transplant effect. Lesson drawing and adaptations, in contrast, are 
more likely to lead to successful engrafting of the transplant.  
Having summarized the literatures on legal transplants, neofunctionalism, and the 
spread of European ideas and institutions, we next investigate how the ECJ’s 
existence shaped the establishment and trajectory of the ATJ.  
2. Copying the ECJ: The Founding of the Andean Tribunal of Justice 
This section focuses on the decision to transplant the European integration model 
from the ECJ to the Andes. In 1969 Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 
agreed to create a common market intended to spur regional economic growth.13 
The five Andean member countries did not trade extensively with each other. But 
they hoped that a regional market would attract foreign capital, increase each 
state’s negotiating leverage, and induce investors to keep profits in the region 
(Avery and Cochraine 1973, p. 198-9). The Andean leaders adopted the European 
model to promote import substitution to lessen dependency on foreign markets, 
organize different manufacturing sectors according to regional capabilities, and 
distribute the benefits of foreign investment so as to lessen economic disparities 
across the region (Horton 1982, p. 40-1).  
The Andean Pact’s founding treaty, the Cartagena Agreement,14 largely copied EC 
institutions. It established a supranational governance structure that included a 
“Commission” of national executives who adopted Andean secondary legislation 
(known as “Decisions”) and a regional administrative body (the “Junta”) that 
supervised the implementation of those Decisions.15 Originally, the Andean Pact did 
not include a court, and Commission Decisions did not have direct domestic effect 
(Horton 1982, p. 44). According to David Padilla, most Latin American trade 
agreements in the 1970s lacked legalized dispute resolution bodies. Padilla 
attributes this omission to the fact that economists—the chief negotiators of these 
agreements—were wary of “legalism” and feared that formal adjudication 
mechanisms would empower politically conservative lawyers and engender 
adversarial litigation (Padilla 1979, p. 91). 
Why, then, did Andean governments decide to create the ATJ? To answer this 
question, we first describe how the idea of creating a supranational court emerged 
almost immediately after the founding of the Andean Pact. We then explain how 
foreign models influenced debates about whether and what type of court to 
establish and why Andean leaders chose to emulate Europe. The section concludes 
with a discussion of Andean adaptations to the ECJ model. 
                                                 
13 The 1966 Bogota Agreement that launched the Andean Integration project envisioned border 
integration, building a regional infrastructure and coordinating monetary policy so that the entire region 
would be one large common market (García Amador 1978, p. 2).. 
14 Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 [hereinafter “Cartagena 
Agreement”]. 
15 The original Junta had three decision-makers, and thus it was meant to be a more nimble leadership 
body than the Commission. For more on the Andean Pact, see (O'Keefe 1997, p. 1; 5-7)(Wionczek 1970, 
p. 59-61). 
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2.1. The Decision to Create the Andean Tribunal of Justice  
From the Andean Pact’s inception, Andean governments believed that they 
possessed the authority to implement the Cartagena Agreement via Presidential 
decrees,16 and they used such decrees to bring the treaty into force.17 This route 
had the advantage, from their perspective, of avoiding national parliaments, in 
which fractious political parties might attempt to block or revise implementing 
legislation (Avery and Cochraine 1973, p. 198 note 36, Thomas 1973, p. 117). But 
the approach also generated opposition from business elites, who disliked the 
Andean Pact’s import substitution policies and invoked the failure to submit the 
treaty to national parliaments to challenge its validity. As we explain below, these 
efforts failed. But the manner in which domestic actors responded to these 
challenges suggested that Andean Decisions would not be given effect within 
domestic legal orders—a prospect that served as a catalyst to create a 
supranational court. 
Business elites filed a key lawsuit in Colombia. In 1971, the Supreme Court 
rejected the suit,18 invoking a long-standing doctrine that disallows procedural 
invalidation of international treaties adopted in good faith.19 But the ruling applied 
only to the Cartagena Agreement itself, implicitly suggesting that Andean 
secondary legislation needed parliamentary approval to be valid in Colombia.20 
However, the decision also included an integration-friendly dissenting opinion which 
intimated that the court’s concerns about Andean secondary legislation would be 
alleviated if there were an Andean tribunal to address challenges to that legislation.  
Businesses opposed to the Andean Pact filed a second suit in the Colombian 
Supreme Court one year later. This time the challenge was to the Andean 
investment code, a centerpiece of the integration process and a lightning rod of 
contestation (O'Keefe 1996). The investment code’s strict limits on repatriation of 
profits by foreign investors galled pro-free market businesses and politicians in the 
region.21 The lawsuit argued that the Colombian Constitution prohibited 
implementing the investment code by presidential decree. Applying the logic of its 
earlier ruling, the Supreme Court held that the code could only be implemented by 
the parliament.  
The Colombian rulings made clear the cost of not having an ECJ-style court; 
namely, that Andean secondary legislation might be invalidated by national judges. 
Proponents of an Andean Tribunal regularly invoked the two Colombian rulings 
when advocating for the creation of a supranational judicial review mechanism 
(Orrego Vicuña 1972, Orrego Vicuña 1974, García Amador 1978, p. 172). 
Moreover, the Junta itself referred to the Colombian rulings when discussing the 
benefits of revising the Andean legal system.22 In 1972, six months after the 
second Colombian ruling, the Commission announced its support for the 
establishment of an Andean Tribunal. The Commission directed the Junta to 
                                                 
16 See Declaración de Bogotá, 16 August, 1966 and Declaracion de los Presidentes de América, 14 April, 
1967. 
17 In Colombia, Decree No. 1245 of 8 August 1969; in Chile, Decree No. 428 of 30 July 1969; in Peru, 
Decree No. 17.851 of 14 October 1969; in Ecuador, Decree No. 1932, 24 October 1969; and Bolivia 
Decree No. 08985, 6 November 1969. 
18 Colombian Supreme Court, ruling of 26 July 1971, published in Derecho de la Integración No. 10, 160-
180. 
19 See “teoria del acto complejo”, Op Cit. Colombian Supreme Court ruling of 26 July 1971, at 165. 
20 Op Cit. Colombian Supreme Court ruling of 26 July 1971, at 166. For a discussion of this point, see: 
(Orrego Vicuña 1972, p. 52) at 49. This same legal arguments were used in a legislative debate in Chile, 
where local legislative actors sought to undermine the Andean investment code that had been 
implemented via presidential decree.  
21 Thomas “The Colombian Supreme Court Decision” at 116, note 21.  Venezuela delayed joining the 
Andean Pact until 1973 because the code was more stringent than local investment rules, and Chile 
withdrew from the Pact in 1976 despite the member states’ begrudging assent to that country’s request 
to raise the percentage of profits that could be repatriated. Scott Horton, Peru and Ancom: A Study in 
the Disintegration of a Common Market, 17 Tex. J. Int’l L. 39, 49 (1982). (Hojman 1981, p. 46-9) 
22 See (JUNAC 1972). Hereafter JUNTAC recommendation to establish a court. 
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produce a report on the “necessity to create a court” for the region.23 The question 
of what type of court remained open, however. 
2.2. The Choice of the ECJ Model 
When Andean officials discussed the creation of a supranational court, several 
potential models were available for their consideration. The officials could have 
emulated an early regional tribunal, the Central American Court of Justice, which 
heard ten cases between 1907 and 1917 before its founding treaty expired (Allain 
2000, p. 73-88). Or they could have embraced the GATT dispute settlement 
system, although at the time member states were blocking many cases from 
proceeding.24 In addition, emulating the GATT system would not have established 
the direct effect of Andean rules nor created a mechanism for supranational judicial 
control of Andean laws. Without such a control, national courts might challenge the 
authority of community law or interpret Andean rules in inconsistent ways. A third 
alternative—the ECJ model—was the most obvious fit given the preexisting 
similarities between other Andean and European institutions. The selection of the 
ECJ model was virtually guaranteed when the Junta asked the Institute for the 
Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL) to evaluate the best model 
for the Andean Pact. 
INTAL is a research center established by the Inter-American Development Bank in 
1965 with the mission of promoting and consolidating regional integration.25 Its 
network of consultants—many of whom are part-time scholars—provides technical 
assistance to implement and enforce integration policies. INTAL served as a 
conveyer belt for the transmission of European ideas into conversations about 
integration in Latin America. At the time, many INTAL consultants had been 
educated and trained in European universities, and they continued to attend pro-
integration academic events in Europe.26 A few had even worked with major 
European integration scholars such as Ernst Haas.27 Through these connections, 
INTAL members were socialized to support integration initiatives. And they 
distributed pro-integration ideas in Latin American through two publications—
Revista Integración Latinoamericana, Derecho de la Integración and Serie 
Publicaciones INTAL.28  
The INTAL network recommended the European legal model, bundling the creation 
of an ECJ-style tribunal with foundational ECJ-created doctrines establishing the 
direct effect and supremacy of community law in national legal orders. By 
incorporating these legal doctrines into its recommendation for an ECJ-style court, 
INTAL also implicitly endorsed the ECJ’s view that the Treaty of Rome is a 
constitutional document that private actors can draw upon to promote regional 
                                                 
23 Sexto Período de Sesiones Extraordinarias, Acta Final, 9-18 December, 1971, Lima, Peru. In the same 
period, another challenge from the Chilean Senate worried Andean governments and officials. That 
challenge also questioned the legitimacy of Andean secondary laws that did not have formal 
parliamentary approval. See discussion in (Saldias 2010). 
24 The GATT system entered a period of disuse between 1963 and 1975. For a discussion, see (Hudec 
1993, p. 11-15). 
25 For a retrospective made by INTAL in 1981 in regard to its contribution to regional integration in Latin 
America, see (INTAL 1981). 
26 For example, in March 1971, Felix Peña, head of INTAL’s legal department and Francisco Orrego 
Vicuña, a Chilean law professor associated to INTAL, participated in a colloquium on the “Legal Aspects 
of Economic Integration” organized by the Hague Academy of International Law. Also attending this 
event were ECJ judge Robert Monaco and Eric Stein from the University of Michigan, one of the first 
American scholar to focus on ECJ doctrine. Cf. Rideau1973; also the Editorial in Derecho de la 
Integración, No. 9, October 1971 p. 8. 
27 The head of INTAL’s legal department was an assistant to Ernst Haas, who, as explained previously, 
was a distinguished European theorist of European integration. Information taken from his CV available 
at http://www.felixpena.com.ar/index.php?contenido=trayectoria. 
28 Most of the published articles advocated bolstering the integration process. For example, between 
1967 and 1968 Derecho de la Integración published translated articles by some of the key actors and 
promoters of European legal integration, including  Maurice Lagrange (avocat general at the ECJ), and 
Pierre Pescatore (ECJ judge), cf. (Lagrange 1968)(Pescatore 1967). 
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integration. The unstated inference was that the Cartagena Agreement should be 
imbued with a similar constitutional status. 
INTAL’s recommendations were an important influence on the creation of the ATJ.29 
In June 1972, the Junta convened a Meeting of Experts that included INTAL 
consultants, Professor Gerard Olivier (the Assistant Director General of EC Legal 
Services), and ECJ Judge Pierre Pescatore. Based on this meeting, the Junta 
prepared a draft of a treaty establishing the ATJ. Representatives of the member 
states discussed the draft treaty in November 1972, and in December a joint Junta-
INTAL working group presented its proposal to the Commission. 30 The proposal 
focused on two key requirements: the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, and 
a supranational mechanism to review the legality of community acts. Copying the 
ECJ’s preliminary reference procedure achieved both of these goals. It created an 
Andean judicial body to review the correct interpretation of Andean rules by 
national judges, and to “reduce unnecessary and sometimes disproportionate 
political tensions” with those judges—an implicit reference to the Colombian 
Supreme Court rulings.31  
Applying the transplants literature reviewed above, we see that the Junta and 
INTAL chose the ECJ model based on a combination of persuasion and socialization. 
On the one hand, the individuals involved genuinely favored creating a 
supranational tribunal to address the widely recognized problem of noncompliance 
with Andean Decisions and to further regional integration (Vargas-Hidalgo 1979, p. 
224). But they reached this conclusion after repeated interactions with European 
officials and judges who may have wanted to spread the ECJ model to other 
regions.  
2.3. Emulating Europe: Implementing the Junta’s Recommendation for an 
Andean Tribunal 
Enthusiasm for creating an Andean judicial body seems to have been strongest 
among the members of the Junta and the INTAL network. Political and business 
leaders, however, were less convinced. In 1975 Elizabeth Ferris interviewed 75 
foreign policymakers, technocrats, and private sector representatives in six Andean 
countries, asking their opinions about various initiatives including the Junta’s 
proposal to create an Andean court. The individuals Ferris interviewed saw little 
need for a court (Ferris 1979, p. 99-100).  
The Andean Junta first presented its proposal for a court, including a draft treaty, in 
December of 1972. In 1974 and again in 1975, the Junta presented statements 
about the report to meetings of the heads of member states, arguing for the 
drafting of a treaty to establish a court (García Amador 1978, p. 105-07). The 
heads of state do not appear to have been overtly hostile to the idea of a tribunal, 
indeed they authorized the Junta to proceed with drafting a Treaty. The incubation 
period for action, however, took five and a half years.32 We found no decisive 
explanation for the long period of inaction. Perhaps the member states were 
distracted by the Andean Pact’s larger political difficulties, such as Venezuela’s 
accession to the Andean Pact in 1973 and the Pinochet coup in the same year, 
which ultimately led to Chile’s withdrawal from the Pact in 1976. In addition, the 
Andean investment code continued to be extremely controversial, and one could 
reasonably ask whether a supranational legal body would have helped to diffuse 
                                                 
29 The Junta’s final report did consider alternatives, but found problems with the GATT, LAFTA, the 
Central American Common Market, and the East African Community models. See (JUNAC 1972, p. 144) 
Also cf. (INTAL 1972) (Paolillo and Ons-Indart 1971). 
30 (García Amador 1978, p. 105).  
31 The report explicitly referenced the Colombian Supreme Court’s decisions, and the minority opinion in 
the 1971 ruling. See JUNTAC recommendation to establish a court (JUNAC 1972, p. 142). 
32 The Treaty was presented for adoption on 8 August 1978. 
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that issue. Whatever its origin, the result was little progress in attracting foreign 
investment or building an Andean common market. 
The Andean Pact’s hibernation in the 1970s underscored that something 
fundamental needed to change if the member states were to achieve their political 
or policy goals. Yet even during this troubled period, Europe continued to serve as a 
model for Andean integration. Europe also faced significant challenges to 
integration in the 1970s, and in response it adopted several institutional 
innovations. In 1970 the EC launched the European Political Cooperation initiative 
to coordinate member states’ foreign policies, and in 1974 it formalized the system 
of Councils of Heads of States to adopt major decisions related to integration. In 
1979 the EC replaced a legislative body comprised of national parliamentarians with 
a system of direct elections to a new European Parliament (Dinan 2004, p. chapters 
4 and 5). 
When integration advocates succeeded in re-launching the Andean integration 
project, they tracked these developments in Europe. The re-launch also provided 
the impetus for creating the ATJ. In 1979 the member states agreed to create an 
Andean Parliament and a Council of Foreign Ministers (Sáchica 1985). And in 1979 
they finally adopted the Treaty Establishing the Tribunal of Justice of the Cartagena 
Agreement,33 accepting nearly in toto the text drafted by INTAL in 1972, which the 
Junta had incorporated into its 1975 recommendation.34 
2.4. Adapting the ECJ Model  
The ATJ replicated the ECJ’s main design features—a noncompliance procedure that 
authorized the Junta to challenge member state violations of Andean law; a 
preliminary reference mechanism for national courts to send questions involving the 
interpretation of Andean law to the ATJ; and a nullification procedure that allowed 
states and private actors to challenge Andean acts as ultra vires. Although the 
treaty does not refer to the supremacy of community law, supremacy was a key 
component of the Junta’s proposal, together with the doctrine of direct effect, which 
the treaty does expressly mention.35  
Even if INTAL members were persuaded of the benefits of the ECJ model, the 
group’s proposal also made a number of adaptations of the ECJ’s founding charter, 
modifications that reflected learning from the ECJ’s experience. For example, the 
ATJ Treaty explicitly directed national courts to implement the Tribunal’s 
preliminary rulings interpreting Andean law, a requirement that the Treaty of Rome 
does not mention but that had become part of ECJ doctrine.36 The treaty also 
includes more detail about the timing of judicial proceedings and the length of the 
judges’ terms in office.37 
Other alterations of the ECJ model seem designed to protect national sovereignty. 
As noted above, the ATJ noncompliance procedure empowered the Junta to 
challenge member state violations of Andean law. But unlike in Europe, only states, 
not private actors, could complain to the Junta about such violations. In addition, 
                                                 
33 See Treaty Establishing the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, 18 International Legal 
Materials 1203 (1979). Hereinafter “Original Treaty Establishing the ATJ.” 
34  The only difference concerns the nullification procedure. The Junta’s draft allowed individuals to file 
nullification suits as long as the infringing act was applicable to them. The final version required that the 
suing individuals show that the infringement caused harm to them. Compare art. 19 Treaty Establishing 
the ACJ with Art 14, “Bases de un tratado para la creación del tribunal de justicia del Acuerdo de 
Cartagena”, in JUNAC 1973, at 148. Andean Commission 1972: Décimo Período de Sesiones 
Extraordinarias de la Comisión, COM/XE-acta final. 
35 JUNAC 1973, at 139 and 148. 
36 Article 31 of the Original Treaty Establishing the ATJ. Federico Mancini and David Keeling discuss how 
the ECJ’s CILFIT doctrine tries to limit the discretion of national judges with respect to referring cases 
and implementing ECJ rulings. (Mancini and Keeling 1992). 
37 For example, article 23 requires the Secretariat to respond within two months. The terms of the ATJ’s 
offices are slightly shorter and there are small differences in procedure. For a comparison between the 
ATJ and the ECJ’s founding documents, see: (Keener 1987). 
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the absence of a supranational procedure to challenge “omissions” by Andean 
officials meant that private actors could not contest the Junta’s refusal to pursue a 
noncompliance complaint. Observer at the time suggested that the lack of an 
omissions procedure was part of a tacit “gentlemen’s agreement” among member 
states to prevent individuals from seizing the Tribunal in such cases,38 which might 
be especially sensitive politically. These concerns may have been informed by the 
experiences of the ECJ, which had adjudicated complaints raised by private parties 
that member states would have preferred to ignore.39 
Although barred from pursuing noncompliance complaints at the supranational 
level, private actors could still file suits in national courts. In principle, national 
judges would then refer questions of Andean law to the Tribunal. However, the ATJ 
Treaty suggested that the Tribunal should exercise restraint in responding to such 
references. Article 30 directed the ATJ to “restrict its interpretation to defining the 
content and scope of the norms of the juridical structure of the Cartagena 
Agreement. The [Tribunal] may neither interpret the contents and scope of national 
law, nor judge the facts in dispute.”40 This language plausibly reflects an awareness 
of the ECJ’s well-known practice of broadly interpreting questions posed by national 
courts, analyzing the facts of the case (a task nominally reserved to national 
judges), and suggesting pro-integration interpretations of domestic rules (Mancini 
1989, p. 606).41  
The ATJ faithfully adhered to these limitations on its authority. The first 
noncompliance proceeding at the ATJ involved a private litigant who attempted to 
file suit directly with the ATJ rather than with a national court. The Tribunal 
dismissed the suit, citing the treaty provision barring private actors from raising 
noncompliance cases.42 When the same legal issue later arose in preliminary 
references involving challenges to a Colombian tariff on Venezuelan aluminum 
imports, the ATJ adhered to its limited role of interpreting Andean law in the 
abstract and not addressing the facts of the case.43 
One should not, however, overstate these adaptations of the ECJ model. The 
architects of the Andean legal system anticipated that private actors would 
challenge noncompliance with Andean rules in national courts.44 Moreover, the 
drafters adopted an innovation that appears intended to enhance state adherence 
to Andean rules. Unlike the EC, which did not then include a procedure for 
penalizing noncompliance with ECJ rulings, the ATJ Treaty adopted a GATT-like 
system that authorized retaliatory trade sanctions if a state refused to follow an ATJ 
judgment against it. This addition suggests that states sought to create a 
supranational legal system capable of inducing respect for Andean rules.45  
                                                 
38 On 16 July 1984 Manuél José Cárdenas, columnist of the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, wrote: “La 
solución estaba, por lo tanto, en presentar las demandas [de incumplimiento] correspondientes. Pero 
como ésta acción está reservada a los gobiernos y éstos acordaron un pacto de caballeros de no 
presentar ninguna demanda hasta que no se modifique el Acuerdo de Cartagena, la acción correctiva del 
Tribunal fue esterilizada totalmente”, cited in (Hurtado Larrea 1985). 
39 For example, German officials were upset that ECJ questioning of turnover equalization taxes ended 
up inundating German courts with legal challenges.  The French became upset at the ECJ’s Charmasson 
decision, which found that France had ceded its authority to make trade arrangements. See (Alter 2001, 
p. 80-5, 151-3)  
40 See Original Treaty establishing the ATJ, supra. 
41 The Benelux Court—another ECJ copy—was also authorized to respond only to the questions posed. 
Treaty Establishing the Benelux Court, 31 March 1965, Art. 6; modified by protocols of 10 June 1981 
and 23 November 1984. Available at http://www.courbeneluxhof.be/fr/basisdocumenten.asp last visited 
July 17, 2011. 
42 ATJ decision 1-AI-87.  
43 We discuss these cases later, when we explain how the ATJ did not follow the ECJ’s approach in Van 
Gend en Loos. See the discussion of 1-AI-1987 and 1-IP-90. 
44 In rejecting the private litigant’s noncompliance suit in 1-AI-87, the ATJ suggested that private 
litigants should instead raise a challenge in a national court.  
45 Article 25 of the original Treaty Creating a Court of Justice for the Cartagena Agreement. (Article 27 of 
the Revised ATJ treaty maintains this sanctioning mechanism).  
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In sum, the design of the ATJ on paper was a close copy of its European cousin. 
When the Tribunal began operations in 1984, however, it faced a slew of practical 
challenges that the ECJ had not experienced. Most notably, the funds that member 
states had pledged to the ATJ were delayed, the Tribunal lacked a permanent 
building to house its operations, and the Junta, member states, and national courts 
filed only a handful of cases.46 The paucity of substantive work was partly an 
artifact of the political stalemate that impeded the creation of a common market. In 
the 1980s, the Andean investment code remained controversial, member countries 
clung to rules that exempted most products traded within the region (Hojman 
1981), and governments were preoccupied by economic and political crises related 
to high levels of foreign debt.  
By the early 1990s, however, the member states once again sought to reinvigorate 
Andean integration (O'Keefe 1996, p. 811-18), beginning in 1991 by laying the 
groundwork for a common external tariff.47 Over the next five years, they amended 
the Cartagena Agreement, replaced the import-substitution policy with a free trade 
model, and rechristened the new integration project as the Andean Community 
(O'Keefe 1996). In 1997 member states also replaced the mostly ineffectual Junta 
with a General Secretariat, increased the size of its budget, and appointed a cadre 
of young lawyers eager to use the Secretariat’s enhanced resources to promote 
regional integration.48  
Reforming the Andean judicial system was part of this wider institutional overhaul. 
The reforms reflected what Andean leaders had learned about that system over the 
previous decade. Notwithstanding the ATJ treaty’s unambiguous text, member 
states often resisted the idea that the Junta could file noncompliance suits before 
the Tribunal. In addition, private litigants rarely used the preliminary reference 
mechanism to challenge national policies that violated community rules. The 
reforms of the Andean legal system were intended to address these 
shortcomings.   
The Cochabamba Protocol, adopted in 1996, brought the Tribunal even closer to the 
ECJ model.
49
                                                
50 The Protocol repealed the ban on private actors bringing violations of 
Andean law to the General Secretariat’s attention.51 The Protocol also recognized 
that private litigants either were not raising challenges to state noncompliance in 
national courts, or that national judges were not referring cases to the ATJ. Going 
beyond the ECJ’s noncompliance procedure, member states authorized private 
 
46 During this decade, national courts filed only thirty-two preliminary references requests, private 
parties filed only three nullification complaints, and national executives refrained from filing any 
noncompliance suits. ATJ judges spent most of their time locating a permanent building for the court and 
resolving labor disputes with staff members. Interview with Ugarte del Pino, Peruvian Judge of the ATJ, 
1990-1995, Lima, Peru, June 22, 2007. 
47 In December of 1991 Andean Presidents approved the Act of Barhona, which ordered the creation of a 
four tiered common external tariff. Decision 370, adopted on 26 November 1994, implemented this 
policy.  
48 Interviews with Monica Rosell, former Legal Secretary of the ATJ and Attorney in the Legal Advisor’s 
Office of the Secretariat General, Quito, Ecuador, Mar. 17, 2005 & Chicago, IL Apr. 1, 2007 [hereafter 
Interviews with Monica Rosell].  
49 Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, as amended by the Protocol of 
Cochabamba (May 28, 1996),  www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/trea/ande_trie2.htm, art. 25 
[hereinafter Revised ATJ Treaty]. The General Secretariat advocated these reforms so that it could 
credibly argue that its own failure to initiate a noncompliance suit would trigger private actors to file 
their own noncompliance actions. Interview with Alfonso Vidales Olviedo, Former head of the Secretariat 
General Legal Advisor’s office 22 June 2007, Lima Peru. 
50 Differences persisted, however, especially in light of changes to the European legal system in 1989, 
when the ECJ gained a Tribunal of First Instance and a system to sanction states that ignored ECJ 
rulings. The ECJ also created doctrines that allowed national courts to sanction states that failed to 
implement community rules in a timely fashion. The ATJ has not followed the ECJ in creating 
decentralized enforcement mechanisms. On expansions to the European legal system, see: (Tallberg 
2003, p. 72-82).  
51 Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, as amended by the Protocol of 
Cochabamba (May 28, 1996),  www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/trea/ande_trie2.htm, art. 25 
[hereinafter Revised ATJ Treaty]. 
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actors to appeal directly to the ATJ if they disagreed with the Secretariat’s 
disposition of a complaint. Another reform facilitated access to the nullification 
procedure by eliminating the requirement that private litigants show direct injury in 
order to challenge Andean acts.52 The member states also added an “omissions” 
procedure so that litigants could challenge the failure to act of any Andean body. 
Lastly, the Protocol relaxed restrictions on preliminary references by indicating that 
ATJ judges could now address how Andean rules applied to the facts of cases when 
necessary for their rulings.53 The end result of these reforms was an Andean legal 
system that, much like the EC, provided private parties with multiple avenues to 
res by allowing private actors to bring noncompliance 
 similarities and differences in the revised 
Andean and European legal systems.54  
                                                
challenge state noncompliance.  
The Cochabamba reforms also reflect learning by Andean actors. The individuals 
who created the ATJ had incorporated ECJ doctrines on the direct effect and 
supremacy of community law and the requirement that national judges accept 
supranational rulings. But they adapted the model to protect national sovereignty, 
authorizing private actors to raise cases only in national courts but not via the 
supranational noncompliance procedure. The next generation of Andean leaders 
realized that this adaptation had in fact undermined the system’s ability to induce 
compliance with Andean rules. Their solution was to return to the institutional 
features of the EC legal system that the founders had originally rejected, and to 
even enhance these featu
cases directly to the ATJ.  
Table 1 summarizes the foregoing discussion. It compares the design of the two 
supranational courts and identifies key
 
52 Revised ATJ Treaty art. 19, adding instead, that the challenged act should affect the individual’s 
“legitimate interests.” 
53 Id. art. 34 (amending ATJ Treaty to authorize the ATJ to “refer to th[e] facts [in dispute] when 
essential for the requested interpretation”). The Cochabamba Protocol also authorizes the ATJ to hear 
three other types of cases: complaints against a Community body that “abstain[s] from carrying out an 
activity for which it is expressly responsible”; arbitrations; and Community labor disputes. Id. arts. 37-
40. The ATJ has only rarely exercised these functions.  
54 There are also smaller differences. For example, the Andean Community prohibits states from 
challenging decisions they voted for to prevent new political leaders from challenging agreements signed 
by previous governments. The Andean Tribunal treaty has slightly different time limits for cases to 
proceed. The ATJ’s court treaty is also more specific about the conditions under which ATJ judges can be 
removed. It is not clear if any of the envisioned scenarios for removal have occurred. Thus, it is hard to 
know how these differences matter in practice. 
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Table 1: The Design of the Revised ECJ and ATJ Compared 
Role  ECJ ATJ  Most significant differences 
Judicial 
Review 
Mechanisms 
Both the ECJ 
and ATJ can 
hear 
challenges to 
the validity of 
community 
rules, to 
actions and 
omissions of 
the 
Commission/
General 
Secretariat 
and to the 
national 
application of 
community 
rules.  
Direct challenges. 
Community institutions (the 
Commission, the Council, 
more recently the 
Parliament) and member 
states can challenge 
community policies, 
decisions and non-action of 
the Commission before the 
ECJ and the Tribunal of First 
Instance. Private litigants 
can raise challenges against 
rules and decisions that 
directly affect them, and 
they can challenge a 
community institution’s 
failure to act. 
Challenges raised in national 
courts. Private litigants can 
raise in national courts 
challenges to community 
rules, Commission actions, 
and national application of 
community rules.  
Direct challenges 
(Nullification actions). 
Community institutions 
(the Commission, the 
General Secretariat), 
and member states can 
challenge community 
policies in front of the 
ATJ. Private litigants can 
raise challenges against 
rules that directly affect 
them, and they can 
challenge the omissions 
of Community actors.  
Challenges raised in 
national courts. Private 
litigants can raise in 
national courts 
challenges to 
community rules, 
Commission and 
General Secretariat 
actions, and national 
application of 
community rules.  
There is no 
parliamentary access to 
challenge Community 
acts, probably because 
the envisioned Andean 
Parliament was 
delayed.  
 
Enforcement 
Both courts 
can rule on 
state 
violations of 
community 
rules.  
Infringement Process. The 
Commission investigates 
noncompliance complaints 
and files infringement suits. 
Member states can bring 
non-compliance charges to 
the ECJ directly. 
Challenges raised in national 
courts. Private actors may 
not raise infringement suits, 
but ECJ doctrine (Van Gend 
en Loos) allows litigants to 
challenge state 
noncompliance in national 
courts.  
Sanctions: Initially, the ECJ 
can declare that a state has 
“failed to fulfill its 
obligation.” Since 1991, the 
Commission can initiate a 
new lawsuit and the ECJ can 
authorize fines against states 
that do not comply with ECJ 
rulings. ECJ doctrine 
(Francovich) also allows 
national courts to impose 
fines when states fail to 
implement community rules. 
Noncompliance 
Procedure. The General 
Secretariat investigates 
noncompliance 
complaints and files 
noncompliance suits. 
Member states may 
bring noncompliance 
charges to the ATJ 
directly. Cochabamba 
reforms allow private 
actors to bring 
noncompliance charges 
to the SG and then to 
the ATJ.  
Challenges Raised in 
National Courts. Where 
domestic statutes allow, 
private actors can raise 
noncompliance suits in 
domestic courts. 
Sanctions: The ATJ can 
authorize a prevailing 
member states to 
restrict or suspend 
community benefits 
received by a non-
complying defendant 
state.  
Cochabamba Protocol 
reforms allow private 
actors to appeal 
General Secretariat 
actions in 
noncompliance cases to 
the ATJ. Also, where 
authorized by domestic 
law, private actors can 
raise noncompliance 
suits in national courts. 
However, interviews 
suggest that the 
authorization needed to 
activate this provision 
was never given. In 
contrast, in Europe 
private litigants 
regularly raise 
noncompliance 
complaints in national 
courts. 
Sanctions: The ATJ can 
authorize another state 
to suspend benefits in 
response to non-
compliance. Since 1991 
the ECJ can authorize 
fines for states that 
ignore its rulings.  
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Members of INTAL and the Junta were unquestionably influenced by Europe’s 
experience and by EC officials. INTAL invited European advisors to offer suggestions 
on draft treaties. Many national and Andean officials studied in Europe, and Andean 
judges regularly consulted EC legislation and ECJ case law. The EC also aided its 
Andean counterpart in other ways. We spoke to a member of the Comisión Andina 
de Juristas, which undertook a number of initiatives to bolster Andean integration. 
In 2000, the Corporación Andina de Fomento, a banking organization that supports 
projects and developments in the region, hired the Comisión to help increase local 
awareness of the ATJ. The project helped to improve the ATJ’s dissemination of 
legal rulings, and it copied the ECJ’s outreach efforts, arranging meetings with 
national judges to increase their awareness of the Andean legal system.55 When 
funding for the Comisión’s project ran short, the Spanish Government and the EC 
provided additional funds. The Comisión also drafted proposals to create a social 
agenda for the Andean Community to build closer connections to the public, 
drawing inspiration from EC programs. The EC also crafted an Association 
Agreement with the Andean Community to help bolster Andean integration 
efforts.56 These examples, which we discovered in our research, are likely only a 
small sample of the ways that the EC helped to promote the Andean Community.  
3. Charting its Own Course: ATJ Lawmaking 1984-2007 
The previous section demonstrated how the ATJ emulates the design of the ECJ. 
This section considers the next logical issue—whether the two courts operate in 
similar ways, as neofunctionalist theory expects.57 As we explain below, the ATJ 
exhibited an early willingness to copy the ECJ’s foundational doctrines even when 
they lacked an explicit textual basis in Andean law. When it came to applying these 
doctrines, however, the Tribunal diverged from its European predecessor in a 
number of significant respects. The ATJ exercised its power to assess the validity of 
Andean rules and to find states in noncompliance with unambiguous Andean laws, 
even where it might expect states to ignore its rulings. But the Tribunal generally 
demurred from litigant requests to construe Andean law expansively or to adopt 
unwritten legal obligations that might have advanced integration, especially when it 
feared that national actors would object.  
3.1. Importing Key ECJ Doctrines  
Early ATJ decisions embraced key ECJ doctrines. When the Tribunal issued its first 
preliminary ruling in 1987, it used the opportunity to explain how the Andean legal 
system worked. The case did not involve the supremacy of Andean law. But the ATJ 
nonetheless noted that member states had declared the “full validity” of the 
following legal principles:  
a) the legal system of the Cartagena Agreement has its own identity and 
autonomy, constitutes a common law and is part of the national legal systems, b) 
the legal system of the Agreement prevails within the framework of its 
competences, over the national norms, without unilateral acts or measures from 
the Member Countries being able to oppose this legal system, c) the Decisions 
                                                 
55 For example, there was a meeting with Peruvian judges in 2003 to convince them to refer more cases 
to the ATJ. See El Principio de Cooperación Judicial Entre el Tribunal Andino y los Tribunales Nacionales 
en el Marco de la Comunidad Andina (Lima, Peru, Nov. 28, 2003), 
http://www.cajpe.org.pe/RIJ/Memorias/principio1.htm (listing attendees and conference program). 
There were also meetings with Bolivian and Venezuelan judges. Phone interviews with the Asesor 
jurídico at the Comisión Andina de Juristas in 2005 and 2006. 20 May 2008 and 8 December 2008. 
56 Phone interviews with the Asesor jurídico at the Comisión Andina de Juristas in 2005 and 2006. 20 
May 2008 and 8 December 2008. A reference to the training session is found at: 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/notas/np4-12-08.htm  
57 This section adapts material previously published in (Alter and Helfer 2011) and (Alter and Helfer 
2010). 
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implying obligations for the Member Countries come into effect on the date 
indicated.58 
The ATJ thus confirmed the founders’ belief that transplanting the ECJ model also 
encompassed copying two foundational doctrines of European law—the supremacy 
of community rules and their direct effect within national legal orders. 
In its second preliminary ruling, the ATJ incorporated additional ECJ doctrines. The 
case raised the question of the status of national laws that conflicted with Andean 
rules but that nevertheless remained on the books. The ATJ reasoned as follows: 
As far as the effect of the norms of integration on national norms, the doctrine and 
jurisprudence indicate that, in the case of conflict, the internal rule will be 
superseded by the community one, which will be applied preferentially, since the 
competence in such a case corresponds to the community. In other words, the 
internal norm becomes inapplicable, to the benefit of the community norm. The 
[ECJ] has repeatedly given this indication (see principally the Costa/ENEL 
Judgments of June 15, 1964, and the Simmenthal Judgment of March 9, 1978) in 
agreement on this point with the spirit of the norms of the Andean integration. This 
effect of supersession of the national norm as a result of the application of 
preference, is especially clear when the later law – which must have priority over 
the prior one, in accordance with universal principles of law – is precisely the 
community norm. 
… 
The [ECJ], in the previously cited judgments, has affirmed the absolute 
preeminence of community law over internal law, an argument that is also 
applicable to the judicial system of the Andean integration, in accordance with what 
was previously indicated.59 
Taken together, these two early rulings revealed that the ATJ shared with the ECJ 
the fundamental premise that community law is different from other types of 
international law.60 The two rulings also appeared to set the stage for the Tribunal 
to follow in the audacious footsteps of its European predecessor. As we explain 
below, however, the ATJ’s jurisprudence later diverged from ECJ doctrine in a 
number of important respects. 
3.2. Deviating By Choice: The Jurisprudence of the ATJ 
Over its nearly twenty-five year existence, the ATJ has been presented with several 
opportunities to emulate the ECJ’s efforts to promote integration through law. It 
has responded by charting a course away from the ECJ model. We discuss four 
examples of divergence and suggest that they were in part a function of weak local 
demand for Andean integration by governments and private actors.  
3.2.1. Are Community Treaties Constitutional Documents? 
The best known and most audacious of the ECJ’s achievements is its transformation 
of the Treaty of Rome into a supranational constitution for Europe.61 The ATJ has 
not followed the ECJ’s bold strategy. Instead, it has allowed member states to 
amend the Andean Community’s founding treaty—the Cartagena Agreement—with 
relative ease and thereby to control the pace and scope of Andean integration.  
                                                 
58 1-IP-87 p.3 
59 1-IP-88 point 2, p. 2-3. 
60 The ATJ reiterated this point in a later decision, in which it held that community law creates a “direct 
application effect” which transforms states and citizens into subjects of a new system in which they both 
possess rights and obligations. This reality distinguishes community law from traditional public 
international law. 1-IP-96: section III. 
61 Proponents of this claim note how the ECJ made the Treaty of Rome directly effective within national 
legal orders, and supreme over national law. They also cite the ECJ’s human rights jurisprudence (Stein 
1981, Weiler 1991). 
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Two decisions from the early 1990s illustrate this divergence.62 The cases were 
closely analogous to the famous Van Gend en Loos case, in which the ECJ 
proclaimed the direct effect of the Treaty of Rome’s free trade rules within national 
legal orders.63 As in Van Gend en Loos, the plaintiffs claimed that the Cartagena 
Agreement imposed immediate constraints on member state actions and thus 
prohibited Colombia from imposing new duties on imports from Venezuela. Unlike in 
Europe, however, Andean governments had previously adopted a Free Trade 
Program that permitted states to adopt broad exemptions from regional free trade 
rules. The plaintiff nevertheless argued that the Cartagena Agreement should be 
interpreted as freezing tariffs for exempted products. Colombia countered that the 
Agreement must be interpreted in conjunction with the Free Trade Program, which, 
it argued, had the effect of revising the treaty (Saldias 2007, p. 12). The ATJ 
agreed with the government, reasoning that the Program afforded member states 
free reign to exempt goods notwithstanding the eventual adoption of broader free 
trade rules envisioned by the treaty.64  
In a later case, the ATJ clarified its views regarding how member states could 
amend the Cartagena Agreement. The ruling involved a challenge to a Decision 
authorizing Peru—then operating under a state of emergency—to derogate from 
certain provisions of Andean law.65 The Junta filed suit to nullify the Decision in 
November 1996, when Andean governments were actively discussing the 
emergency. A few months later, Andean governments adopted the Sucre Protocol, 
one provision of which addressed Peru’s situation.66 But the ATJ still had the Junta’s 
nullification suit on its docket, which it refused to dismiss.67 In its ruling on the 
merits, the Tribunal found that the Decision granting a derogation to Peru violated 
the Cartagena Agreement, but that its illegality had been “purged” by the Sucre 
Protocol. In other words, the ATJ did not need to nullify the Decision because a 
valid law had already superseded it. The Tribunal also distinguished between 
Decisions—which are secondary legislation adopted by member states—and 
Protocols which are treaty amendments agreed to during a “conference of 
plenipotentiaries” (reunion de plenipotenciarios).68 This distinction suggests that 
the procedure for adopting Protocols is more onerous than that for adopting 
Decisions. Formally speaking, the process of amending the Cartagena Agreement is 
the same as that for amending the EC’s founding charter: the heads of member 
states must meet to adopt the amendments, which must then be ratified by each 
state.69 In reality, however, convening a reunion de plenipotenciarios does not 
appear to be very difficult. There are fewer member states in the Andean 
                                                 
62 See 1-IP-90 and 3-IP-93. These cases were later iterations of the 1987 complaint that the ATJ 
rejected because private actors were at the time barred from raising noncompliance cases. See 1-AI-
1987. 
63 Van Gend en Loos decision ECJ 26/62 [1963] ECR 1, 12. 
64 1-IP-90: conclusion point 1. 
65 The 1990s were a time of significant unrest in Peru. The most noteworthy event was the autogolpe 
(self-coup) in which President Alberto Fujimori, with the support of the military, suspended the 
constitution, dissolved the Congress, and purged the judiciary. 
66 The Sucre Protocol of July 30, 1997 amended a number of provisions of the Cartagena Agreement. It 
was much like the European Union’s Single European Act that re-launched European integration by 
advancing the Treaty of Rome’s longstanding goal of developing a common market. The Protocol 
contained a “transitory provisional chapter” stating that the Free Trade Area would become operational 
by the end of 2005, and it allowed Peru to negotiate with the Commission its entry into the common 
external tariff system. See: http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/normativa/ande_trie4.htm. For a 
summary of the Protocol’s key achievements, see 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/press/press/np14-4-03b.htm. 
67 The Tribunal reasoned that Decisions were “public acts” and that there was a general interest in 
ensuring the validity of such acts notwithstanding the Junta’s change of mind. Point 1.4.1 of ATJ ruling 
1-AN-1996. 
68 Points 2.4 & 2.5 of ATJ ruling 1-AN-1996. 
69 It isn’t entirely clear what qualifies as a reunion de plenipotenciarios. Would a meeting of heads of 
states suffice? One difficulty in answering this question is that ‘Decisions’ are the formal label attached 
to all Andean laws, and it often isn’t clear whether a ‘Decision’ was adopted at a reunion de 
plenipotenciarios, or in a Commission meeting.  
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Community than in the EC, no evidence of a reluctance to convene 
intergovernmental conferences, and no larger acquis of normative commitments 
that national governments view as inviolable. In addition, the existence of powerful 
Executives means that domestic ratification of treaty amendments is usually 
assur
oes the Community Possess Implied Powers to Preempt National 
f 
petence. Weiler aptly 
summar
on is 
or 
for an indefinite time until they are effectively covered by Community norms.”73  
                                                
ed. 
3.2.2. D
Laws?  
Another question that both the ATJ and ECJ faced was whether member states 
could adopt national legislation in the absence of community rules. The founding 
treaties, which primarily focused on creating supranational institutions and setting 
collective goals, did not answer this question. As compared to the ECJ, the ATJ has 
given governments significantly greater leeway to adopt national laws in areas o
community competence and has refused to imply powers for Andean institutions.  
The ECJ addressed the issue of implied powers in the ERTA decision.70 As Joseph 
Weiler has explained, the ECJ conferred on EC institutions the authority to adopt 
treaties binding on the member states—a power not mentioned in the Treaty of 
Rome. To achieve this result, the court “sidestep[ped] the presumptive rule of 
interpretation typical in international law, that treaties must be interpreted in a 
manner that minimises encroachment on state sovereignty.” Instead, it “favoured a 
teleological, purposive rule drawn from the book of constitutional interpretation” 
(Weiler 1991, p. 2416). The ECJ later barred states from enacting any national 
legislation on issues within the community’s exclusive com
ized the consequences of the ECJ’s doctrinal moves: 
In a number of fields, most importantly in common commercial policy, the [ECJ] 
held that the powers of the Community were exclusive. Member States were 
precluded from taking any action per se, whether or not their action conflicted with 
a positive measure of Community law. In other fields, the exclusivity was not an a 
priori notion. Instead, only positive Community legislation in these fields triggered a 
preemptive effect, barring Member States from any action, whether or not in actual 
conflict with Community law, according to specific criteria developed by the court. 
Exclusivity and pre-emption not only constitute an additional constitutional layer on 
those already mentioned but also have had a profound effect on Community 
decision making. Where a field has been pre-empted or is exclusive and acti
needed, the Member States are pushed to act jointly. (Weiler 1991, p. 2416)  
The ATJ, although aware of the ECJ’s experience, chose a different path—the 
principle of complemento indispensable. According to this doctrine, first espoused in 
a 1988 ruling, member states may enact domestic laws necessary to implement a 
community rule provided that those laws do not obstruct or nullify the community 
rule.71 In a 1990 decision, the ATJ further cabined the preemptive force of Andean 
law. It stressed that integration is a gradual, incremental process that limits the 
extent to which community rules preempt national authority even in areas, such as 
intellectual property,72 where Andean law clearly governs: “[I]t seems logical that 
many of these diverse issues, even if they have to be a matter of common 
regulation in the beginning, are still within the competence of the national legislat
 
70 Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. 
71 ATJ decision 2-IP-88: point 3.  
72 The ATJ has been given greater preemptive force to Andean intellectual property rules than to other 
areas of Andean law. The Tribunal has relied on the extensive and detailed secondary legislation on 
patents, trademarks, and copyrights as an indication that the member states had “sovereignly 
transferred” their “exclusive authority” over intellectual property issues to the community level.  See 1-
IP-96: section III (holding that, in the area of intellectual property, member states cannot deviate from 
“the common interests” of the community except by acting through Andean institutions). 
73 2-IP-90: see point 1.  
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3.2.3. How Much Deference is Appropriate When National Judges Apply 
Community Law? 
Both supranational tribunals have considered how to define their relationships with 
national judges at the boundary between community law and domestic law. In 
Simmenthal, the ECJ articulated a doctrine that includes a mandatory obligation for 
“every national court [to] apply Community law in its entirety and . . . accordingly 
set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or 
subsequent to the Community rule.”74 In subsequent cases, the ECJ set stringent 
limitations on national judges’ ability to interpret EC law without first seeking the 
court’s guidance.75  
Although the ATJ referred to the Simmenthal decision in early preliminary rulings,76 
it later refused to endorse the full implications of the case and its progeny. The key 
dispute involved various challenges to municipal alcohol licenses in Colombia. In 
one suit, opponents argued before the Colombian Constitutional Court that the 
licenses violated Andean law.77 The court rejected the suit, concluding that 
community law did not supplant Colombian law. Unlike human rights treaties, which 
have quasi-constitutional status in Colombia,78 Andean law was, according to the 
court, equivalent to domestic legislation. Because such laws “and the Constitution 
do not share the same hierarchy, nor are [they] an intermediate legal source 
between the Constitution and ordinary domestic laws, . . . contradictions between a 
domestic law and Andean community law will not have as a consequence the non-
execution of the [domestic] law.” The Colombian Court adopted somewhat abstruse 
reasoning, stating that community law has “primacy” over conflicting national law, 
but suggesting that primacy means that community law “displaces but does not 
abrogate or render non-executable” conflicting national legislation.79  
A later iteration of the dispute involved a preliminary reference from another 
Colombian court, the Consejo de Estado, which arose after the ATJ upheld a 
separate noncompliance challenge to the licenses by two other member states. Had 
the Tribunal followed Simmenthal, it would have directed the national judges to 
invalidate the licenses as contrary to Andean law. Instead, the ATJ merely repeated 
its finding from the earlier noncompliance suit without indicating whether the 
Consejo de Estado was required to give effect to that finding.  
This deference is consistent with the ATJ’s broader understanding of the division of 
authority between itself and domestic courts. Our review of all preliminary rulings 
through 2007 disclosed only one case, decided in 1998, where the ATJ considered 
how its interpretation of Andean law might apply to the facts presented.80 In all 
                                                 
74 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (II), ECJ Case 106/77 (1978) ECR 629, 
[1978] CMLR 263. Quote from CMLR p. 283. 
75 SRL CILFIT v. Ministry of Health (I), ECJ case 283/81, [1982] ECR 3415. For an explanation of how the 
ECJ used this ruling to constrain national judges, see (Mancini and Keeling 1992). 
76 See discussion of 1-IP-88, supra. 
77 The licenses were also successfully challenged in an ATJ noncompliance suit. See 3-AI-97. 
78 The Constitutional Court ruling notes that international human rights agreements ratified by Colombia 
are part of a “bloque de constitucionalidad” which gives them a status superior to than national law. 
Article 93 of Colombia’s 1993 Constitution states: “International treaties and agreements ratified by the 
Congress that recognize human rights and that prohibit their limitation in states of emergency have 
priority domestically.” Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia C-256/98 of 27 May 1998, Section 3.1. 
79 Ibid. Section 3.1. 
80 The 1998 case concerned Venezuela’s implementation of a common Andean policy that aimed to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the Andean shipping industry. The ATJ found the facts provided to be 
insufficient, thus it added to the information provided by the Venezuelan court, chronicling Naviera 
Pacifico’s efforts to get the Venezuelan government to create domestic incentives that might help it 
weather economic hard times, and to exclude the company NORSUL from transporting cargo from the 
route assigned to Naviera Pacifico since the Brazilian policies excluded shipping companies from the 
Andean Region. Although the ATJ did not direct the Venezuelan court to grant subsidies, the clear 
implication was that Venezuela must exclude access to ships from countries that do not grant reciprocal 
access to ships from other Andean Community member states. The application of these principles to the 
facts at hand was thus obvious. See 19-IP-98. 
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other preliminary rulings, the ATJ explicated the meaning of Andean law in the 
abstract without suggesting how national judges should resolve the dispute. This 
deferential approach has continued even after the 1996 Cochabamba Protocol, 
discussed above, in which member states indicated that the ATJ could consider the 
facts of preliminary references and thus, implicitly, guide domestic courts in the 
application of Andean law.81  
*  *  *  *  * 
When ATJ judges considered each of the three legal issues discussed above, they 
were unquestionably aware of the analogous ECJ precedents interpreting EC law. 
They nonetheless chose to diverge from the path that their European colleagues 
had previous trod. To be sure, the ATJ was not required to follow EC doctrine. 
Although both communities share the goal of promoting regional integration, the EC 
is a distinct legal system and, as such, ECJ rulings are at most persuasive authority 
for interpreting Andean law. Nevertheless, given the very similar design of the two 
supranational tribunals and the repeated references to ECJ doctrine by the drafters 
of the ATJ Treaty, one might have expected an Andean “copy” of a European 
“model” to adhere more closely to the doctrines of its parent.82  
What, then, explains the distinctive evolution of ATJ jurisprudence? Why, for 
example, did the ATJ allow member states broad leeway to circumvent the 
Cartagena Agreement’s core objectives? The cases themselves do not answer this 
question, but the broader political context into which a supranational tribunal was 
transplanted suggests a number of plausible explanations. One possibility is that 
many Andean Pact programs from the 1960s and 1970s predated the ATJ’s 
existence. It would have been too controversial for the Tribunal to overturn these 
longstanding policies.  
A second possibility relates to the basic premise of the region’s early integration 
agenda. As previously discussed, the Andean Pact’s import substitution policy and 
regional industrial programs depended heavily on foreign investment, which never 
materialized. The lack of progress regarding Andean industrial development created 
a conundrum: should a state be held to the community’s market liberalization goals 
if it had not received the quid pro quo of industrial development assistance? Andean 
law resolved this problem by creating a Free Trade Program that allowed member 
states to exempt politically sensitive products (Hojman 1981). This resolution was 
in tension with the Cartagena Agreement, which prohibited imposing new trade 
barriers and required the progressive removal of those barriers. But it was a 
plausible political compromise, one that was arguably necessary to keep the 
troubled integration project afloat, and one that the ATJ may have been unwilling to 
undermine without a clear textual basis in the treaty.  
A third possibility is that the judges’ interpretation of Andean law reflects a belief 
that the Tribunal lacks the deep political support needed to promote legal 
integration more aggressively. Since member states can easily amend the 
Cartagena Agreement, the ATJ may have been reticent to interpret the treaty as a 
constitutional charter that limits national power and discretion, as the ECJ has done 
for the Treaty of Rome. Also unlike in Europe, national judges in the Andes have 
generally refrained from setting aside national laws that conflict with community 
law, leading the ATJ to back-pedal from its early embrace of the ECJ’s Simmenthal 
doctrine. However, in those few areas where greater legal and political support for 
integration exists—in particular, intellectual property law—the Tribunal has been 
willing to be bolder, especially when the General Secretariat or member states as a 
group have expressed support for its efforts.  
                                                 
81 See the discussion of the Cochabamba changes regarding preliminary ruling cases, supra.  
82 For one issue—the primacy of community law over other international agreements such as the WTO—
the ATJ has been more willing than the ECJ to extend its authority. Over time, however, the ECJ has 
interpreted EC rules so as to constrain member states from undermining those rules through multilateral 
treaties (Alter and Helfer 2011). 
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4. Supranational Transplants: Lessons from the Andean Tribunal of Justice 
A critical issue that emerges from the literature on legal transplants, reviewed 
above, is the existence and extent of local demand for transplanted laws and 
institutions. Neofunctionalist theory assumes that private litigants who stand to 
benefit from regional integration will raise legal claims before supranational bodies 
and thereby help to develop community rules. Adopting a different perspective, 
studies of the export of ideas offer a range of reasons why local actors may either 
embrace or reject transplants. Laws and institutions copied in response to coercive 
external pressure or unreflective mimicry are likely to be resisted or remain 
unused. In contrast, transplants that local actors adopt voluntarily, and transplants 
that are adapted to local needs, are more likely to be effective.  
This article has applied these theories to analyze the transplant of EC laws and 
institutions to South America. When Andean governments first established the 
Andean Pact, they copied the European model but chose not to replicate its judicial 
system. More than a decade later, governments added a supranational tribunal 
based on the ECJ. The initial impetus to create the ATJ came from challenges to 
Andean integration in Chile and Colombia. Andean officials responded to these 
challenges by tasking a pro-integration network of experts to propose the best legal 
system for the Andean Pact. The actors who recommended the creation of an ECJ-
style Tribunal had been either socialized or persuaded by the ECJ’s mostly 
successful experience. But they nonetheless adapted the ECJ model to take account 
that the governments that would act on their recommendation were concerned 
about national sovereignty and ambivalent about adding a court. It then took five 
years for member states to adopt the Junta’s proposal, and another three years for 
them to agree to create a supranational court, which they did as part of a package 
of reforms intended to re-launch Andean integration. 
The copying of the ECJ went beyond the formal design features such judicial access 
rules, types of cases, and referrals from national courts. Andean leaders also 
incorporated the direct effect and supremacy doctrines of EC law, which the ATJ 
confirmed in its early rulings that seemingly embraced the pro-integrative path set 
by the ECJ. In later cases, however, the ATJ has charted its own course. Although 
litigants presented the ATJ with a number of opportunities to expand the reach of 
community law, to promote Andean integration, or to enhance its own powers, the 
Tribunal responded far more cautiously than the ECJ. In particular, it declined to 
transform the Cartagena Agreement into a constitution for the Andean Community, 
it refused to imply powers for Andean authorities, and it refrained from requiring 
national judges to give effect to its rulings. The ATJ thus refused to follow the ECJ’s 
experience as an expansionist lawmaker. But it has asserted its delegated authority 
even when doing so involved ruling against member states, and even when it knew 
that that states might not comply with its rulings (Alter and Helfer 2010, p. 577-9). 
How, then, did the existence of the ECJ shape the ATJ’s founding and its 
subsequent doctrinal trajectory? Andean leaders, aware of the ECJ’s well-known 
activism, included safeguards in the original ATJ Treaty to limit the ability of private 
actors to challenge national laws. Perhaps most importantly, private actors were 
barred from filing noncompliance suits with the Junta or the Tribunal. Instead, they 
were limited to requesting national judges—most of whom were unaware of or 
unsympathetic to Andean law—to refer cases to the ATJ. Only a handful of such 
referrals were ever made outside of the exceptional area of intellectual property. 
And in those cases that reached the Tribunal, the ATJ Treaty limited the judges 
from applying Andean laws to the facts and thus giving guidance to national courts.  
The member states relaxed these structural constraints in 1996 when they adopted 
a package of institutional reforms that expanded the court’s docket. These 
adaptations suggest lesson drawing, both from the ATJ’s first twelve years and from 
the EC legal system. But despite these changes intended to increase the 
effectiveness of the Andean legal system, the ATJ has continued to issue mostly 
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narrow, technical rulings and avoid the expansionist lawmaking of its jurisdictional 
cousin. This may be because national judges have remained unpersuaded that the 
supremacy of Andean law requires them to revise existing practices and set aside 
conflicting national rules.  
One reason for this circumspect approach is that the ATJ has confronted the same 
core challenge that all supranational transplants face: how to enlist the support of 
key interlocutors and compliance constituencies within the member states. In 
Europe, the ECJ cultivated national judges as key allies in promoting legal 
integration. In copying the ECJ’s preliminary ruling system, and in authorizing 
private litigants to bring suit invoking Andean rules in domestic courts, Andean 
officials opened the door for the ATJ to forge its own alliances with domestic judges. 
But those judges have declined to become the Tribunal’s active partners. As we 
explain elsewhere, once the initial barriers to referrals were surmounted, national 
judges have been willing to refer cases when Andean rules unambiguously require 
them to do so (Helfer and Alter 2009, p. 900-11). But they do not work in tandem 
with the ATJ to develop community law. They do not send provocative questions to 
the Tribunal, and they have displayed little appetite for defying governments by 
setting aside domestic laws or decrees that conflict with Andean law. 
The ATJ has, however, forged a different set of alliances—with domestic intellectual 
property agencies. These agencies apply Andean Decisions to determine whether to 
register the thousands of applications for trademarks and patents that they receive 
from private firms and the attorneys who represent them. The agencies were thus 
logical interlocutors for ATJ judges. Agency officials repeatedly sought the Tribunal’s 
guidance to clarify ambiguities and lacunae in Andean law, and they have they 
habitually applied those rulings even when doing so challenges national executive 
or legislative decisions. Over time, the ATJ and the agencies developed a symbiotic 
relationship that helped to establish intellectual property as a distinctive “island of 
effective international adjudication” in the Andean Community legal system (Helfer 
et al. 2009). 
These findings have important implications for neofunctionalist theory, including its 
recent revival as a theory of legal integration. Neofunctionalism predicts an 
alignment between the demands of private litigants and the interests of 
supranational judges to promote integration. Our study indicates that it is 
insufficient for litigants to challenge domestic rules; a supranational court must 
provide a hospitable venue for using community law to dismantle conflicting 
national policies. The ATJ’s refusal to interpret Andean law purposively to help 
litigants further their economic interests created a vicious circle that inhibited the 
filing of additional cases and diminished the domestic influence of Andean law.83 
The only exception to this pattern is in the area of intellectual property, where the 
ATJ enjoys the support of a specialized advocacy network whose branches extend 
both within the state (the administrative agencies that apply Andean laws when 
reviewing patent and trademark applications) and outside of it (the private firms 
that utilize intellectual property and the attorneys that defend their interests).  
In sum, the ATJ’s experience suggests—contrary to the expectations of 
neofunctionist theory—that transplanting supranational laws and legal institutions is 
insufficient in itself to stimulate domestic demand for those laws and institutions, 
even where a handful of entrepreneurial litigants present a supranational court with 
opportunities to embed the transplants, and even where at least some 
supranational judges seem inspired to promote Andean legal integration (Alter 
2009, p. 63-91). 
At the level of legal doctrine, the ATJ’s selective emulation of the ECJ jurisprudence 
offers insights for ideational diffusion theory. The ECJ is widely viewed as 
                                                 
83 This is also true for the ECJ, where ECJ rulings can either increase or decrease litigation on specific 
issues.  See: (Alter 2000, p. 512-5). 
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authoritative by judicial and legal communities around the world. This exalted 
stature offered a ready blueprint for Andean judges: slavishly follow the ECJ’s 
doctrinal innovations and defend that decision by referencing the many design 
similarities that the two courts share. But the ATJ declined to chart this course, 
suggesting that socialization is not the mechanism through which the ECJ model 
diffuses. Instead, the Tribunal’s a la carte approach suggests lesson-drawing—a 
form of mimicry in which the judges recognized that legal doctrines that served 
salutary functions in Europe might not work well in the Andes where the pace and 
scope of integration were far more modest. Adapted mimicry, as opposed to blind 
mimicry, gave ATJ judges discretion to pick and choose which EC legal doctrines 
were germane to the Andean Community context and consonant with local political 
realities.84  
Several legal scholars have argued that the European experience is sui generis in 
ways that preclude the ECJ from serving as a guide for other international courts 
and tribunals (Alvarez 2003, p. 225-7, Posner and Yoo 2005, p. 55-7). The extent 
to which the ATJ has selectively copied from the ECJ reveals, however, that a 
supranational court can be a model in some respects but not in others. In 
particular, the ATJ’s refusal to emulate the ECJ’s penchant for expansionist 
lawmaking suggests that transplanting key design features and legal doctrines does 
not necessarily result in transplanting judicial activism in the interpretation of key 
legal texts (Alter and Helfer 2010). 
There are several reasons to expect that the ECJ will remain an influential model for 
other international courts and tribunals. The ECJ has developed extensive and well-
reasoned legal doctrines that have benefitted from a large and stable secretariat, a 
cadre of professional clerks (known as referendaires), and an active and ongoing 
dialogue with critics including law faculty and national high court judges. ECJ 
rulings are also translated into multiple languages and posted on the internet, 
making it easy for judges around the world to access and review them.  
The ECJ will also continue to serve as a model because the European Union is 
interested in spreading supranational courts to other regions and in helping them 
flourish. Europe provides free consultations, encourages judicial networks, and 
gives in-kind and financial support to resource-starved governments and 
supranational judges. European universities also invite students from around the 
world to study the European integration system, generating pro-integration 
scholarship by local actors. The EC provides these forms of aid without overt strings 
attached because it believes its model is worth emulating (Alter 2011b, Lenz 2011 
(forthcoming)).  
Over time, however, ECJ transplants may find that they have more in common with 
each other than with their parent. The ATJ—which has close to thirty years of 
experience operating in a developing country context—may in fact be a more 
suitable guide for more recent ECJ copies to consult and emulate. The next 
question to consider is how other supranational tribunals based on the European 
model differ from the ECJ. Because judges on international tribunals, and scholars 
writing about these tribunals, often invoke similar ECJ rulings, one can easily be 
misled into assuming that legal systems and judicial practices are more alike than 
they in fact are (Nyman Metcalf and Papageorgiou 2005, p. 86-92, O'Brien and 
Morano-Foadi 2009, van der Mei 2009). The comparisons in this article demonstrate 
that scholars must consider both similarities and differences and pay careful 
attention to how legal transplants actually operate in practice.  
                                                 
84 The ECJ also relies on persuasion to influence public and private actors to follow its lead. We explore 
how the ECJ’s environment differed in (Alter and Helfer 2010). 
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, Osvaldo Saldías  Transplanting the European Court of Justice… 
Bibliography 
Allain, J., 2000. A century of international adjudication : The rule of law and its 
limits. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
Alter, K. & Helfer, L., 2010. Nature or nurture: Judicial lawmaking in the European 
Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice. International Organization, 
64 (4), 563-92. 
Alter, K.J., 1998. Who are the masters of the treaty?: European governments and 
the European Court of Justice. International Organization, 52 (1), 125-152. 
Alter, K.J., 2000. The European legal system and domestic policy: Spillover or 
backlash, International Organization, 54 (3), 489-518. 
Alter, K.J., 2001. Establishing the supremacy of European law: The making of an 
international rule of law in Europe Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Alter, K.J., 2009. Jurist advocacy movements in Europe: The role of euro-law 
associations in European integration (1953-1975). In Alter, K.J. ed. The 
European Court's political power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 63-91. 
Alter, K.J., 2010. The new international courts: A bird’s eye view. BCICS Working 
Paper No. 09-001. 
Alter, K.J., 2011a. The evolving transnational legal order. Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science, 7, 16.1-29. 
Alter, K.J., 2011b. The global spread of European style international courts. West 
European Politics. 
Alter , K.J., Forthcoming 2013 The New Terrain of International Law: International 
Courts in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Alter, K.J. & Helfer, L.R., 2011. Legal integration in the Andes: Lawmaking by the 
Andean Tribunal of Justice. European Law Journal 17 (5), 701-715. 
Alvarez, J., 2003. The new dispute settlers: (half) truths and consequences. Texas 
International Law Journal, 38, 405-444. 
Avery, W.P. & Cochraine, J.D., 1973. Innovation in Latin American regionalism: The 
Andean common market. International Organization, 27 (2), 181-223. 
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K. & Richard, J.-F., 2003. The transplant effect. American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 51, 163-203. 
Börzel, T.A. & Risse, T. eds. 2009. The transformative power of europe: The 
European Union and the diffusion of ideas. Berlin: Frei Universität Berlin. 
Burley, A.-M. & Mattli, W., 1993. Europe before the court. International 
Organization, 47 (1), 41-76. 
Caporaso, J. & Keeler, J., 1995. The European Union and regional integration theory. 
In Rhodes, C. & Mazey, S. eds. The state of the European Union. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner/Longmann, 29-62. 
Cichowski, R., 2007. The European Court and civil society: Litigation, mobilization 
and governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dinan, D., 2004. Europe recast: A history of the European Union. Boulder: Lynn 
Rienner. 
Ferris, E.G., 1979. National political support for regional integration: The Andean 
Pact. International Organization, 33 (1), 83-104. 
Foster, F.H., 2010. American trust law in a Chinese mirror. Minnesota Law Review, 
94, 602-651. 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 28 
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, Osvaldo Saldías  Transplanting the European Court of Justice… 
 
García Amador, F.V., 1978. The Andean legal order: A new community law. Dobbs 
Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications. 
Goldstein, J.H., Rivers, D. & Tomz, M., 2007. Institutions in international relations: 
Understanding the effects of GATT and WTO on world trade. International 
Organization, 31 (Winter), 37-67. 
Graham, E., Shipan, C. & Volden, C., 2008. The diffusion of policy diffusion 
research. 
Graziadei, M., 2009. Legal transplants and the frontiers of legal knowledge. 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 10 (2), 723-743. 
Haas, E., 1975. The obsolescence of regional integration theory. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Hartley, T., 1996. The European Court, judicial objectivity and the constitution of 
the European Union. Law Quarterly Review, 112, 95-109. 
Helfer, L. & Alter, K., 2009. The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its interlocutors: 
Understanding the preliminary ruling reference patterns in the Andean 
Community. Journal of International Law and Politics, 42 (4), 871-928. 
Helfer, L., Alter, K. & Guerzovich, M.F., 2009. Islands of effective international 
adjudication: Constructing an intellectual property rule of law in the Andean 
Community. American Journal of International Law, 103, 1-47. 
Hojman, D.E., 1981. The Andean Pact: Failure of a model of integration? Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 20 (2), 139-159. 
Horton, S., 1982. Peru and Ancom: A study in the disintegration of a common 
market. Texas International Law Journal, 17, 39-61. 
Hudec, R.E., 1993. Enforcing international trade law: Evolution of the modern GATT 
system. New Hampshire: Butterworths. 
Hurtado Larrea, E., 1985. Los incumplimientos y la acción asignada a la 
competencia del tribunal. In Bid-Intal ed. El tribunal de justicia del acuerdo de 
cartagena. Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, 69-81. 
Intal, 1972. Estudio sobre procedimientos para solucionar conflictos. Derecho de la 
Integración, 11 (Octubre). 
Intal, 1981. El intal y la integración Latinoamericana durante 1980. Integración 
Latinoamericana, 54 (Enero-Febrero), 1-11. 
Jacoby, W., 2000. Imitation and politics: Redesigning modern Germany. Ithaca, 
N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press. 
Jacoby, W., 2004. The enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering 
from the menu in Central Europe. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jacoby, W., 2006. Inspiration, coalition and substitution: External influences on 
postcommunist transformations. World Politics, 58 (4), 623-651. 
Informe de la junta sobre el establecimeinto de órgano jursidiccional del Acuerdo de 
Cartagena. 1972. 
Keener, E.B., 1987. The Andean Common Market Court of Justice: Its purpose, 
structure, and future. Emory Journal of International Dispute Resolution, 2 
(1), 37-72. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W., 1997. Legal 
determinants of external finance. The Journal of Finance, 52 (3). 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 29 
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, Osvaldo Saldías  Transplanting the European Court of Justice… 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W., 1998. Law and 
finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6), 1113-1155. 
Lagrange, M., 1968. La interpretación unitaria del derecho de las Comunidades 
Europeas: Aspectos de interpretación prejudicial. Derecho de la Integración, 3 
(Octubre), 51-80. 
Legrand, P., 2001. What "legal transplants"? In Nelken, D. & Feest, J. eds. Adapting 
legal cultures. Portland: Hart Publishing, 55-69. 
Lenz, T., 2011 (forthcoming). Spurred emulation: The EU and regional integration in 
MERCOSUR and SADC. West European Politics. 
Maduro, M.P., 1998. We the court : The European Court of Justice and the european 
economic constitution: A critical reading of article 30 of the EC treaty Oxford: 
Hart Publishers. 
Mancini, F., 1989. The making of a constitution for Europe. Common Market Law 
Review, 24, 595-614. 
Mancini, F. & Keeling, D., 1992. From CILFIT to ERTA: The constitutional challenge 
facing the European Court. Yearbook of European Law, 11, 1-13. 
Mattli, W., 1999. The logic of regional integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Nelken, D., 2001. Towards a sociology of legal adaptation. In Feest, J. & Nelken, D. 
eds. Adapting legal cultures. Oxford: Hart, 3-54. 
Nye, J.S., 1971. Comparing common markets: A revised neofunctionalist model. 
International Organization, 24 (4), 796-835. 
Nyman Metcalf, K. & Papageorgiou, I., 2005. Regional integration and courts of 
justice. Antwerp: Intersentia. 
O'brien, D. & Morano-Foadi, S., 2009. The Carribbean Court of Justice and legal 
integration within CARICOM: Some lessons from the European Community. 
The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 8, 399-429. 
O'keefe, T.A., 1996. How the Andean Pact transformed itself into a friend of foreign 
enterprise. International Lawyer, 30 (4), 811-824. 
O'keefe, T.A., 1997. Latin American trade agreements Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: 
Transnational Publishers. 
Orrego Vicuña, F., 1972. La incorporación del ordenamiento jurídico subregional al 
derecho interno, análisis de la práctica y jurisprudencia de Colombia. Derecho 
de la Integración, (No. 11 (Octubre)), 39-59. 
Orrego Vicuña, F., 1974. La creación de un tribunal de justicia en el Grupo Andino. 
Derecho de la Integración, 15 (Marzo), 31-46. 
Padilla, D., 1979. The judicial resolution of legal disputes in the integration 
movements of the hemisphere. Lawyers of the Americas, 11 (1), 75-95. 
Paolillo, F. & Ons-Indart, C., 1971. Estudios de los procedimientos de hecho 
utilizados para la solución de conflictos en la ALALC. Derecho de la 
Integración, 9 (Octubre), 19-74. 
Pescatore, P., 1967. Distribución de competencia y de poderes entre los estados 
miembros de las Comunidades Europeas: Estudio de las relaciones entre las 
comunidads y los estaods miembros. Derecho de la Integración, 1 (Octubre), 
108-152. 
Pitarakis, J.-Y. & Tridimas, G., 2003. Joint dynamics of legal and economic 
integration in the European Union. European Journal of Law and Economics, 
16, 357-68. 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 30 
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, Osvaldo Saldías  Transplanting the European Court of Justice… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 31 
Posner, E.A. & Yoo, J.C., 2005. A theory of international adjudication. California Law 
Review, 93 (1), 1-72. 
Rideau, J. (ed.) 1973: Les Aspects juridiques de l’integration ‘economique. 
Académie de droit international de La Haye, Colloque 1971, Sijthoff, Leiden 
Romano, C., 1999. The proliferation of international judicial bodies: The pieces of 
the puzzle. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 31 
(Summer), 709-751. 
Sáchica, L.C., 1985. Introducción al derecho comunitario Quito: Colección de 
Estudios del Tribunal de Justicia del Acuerdo de Cartagena. 
Saldias, O., 2007. Supranational courts as engines of disintegration. Berlin Working 
Paper on European Integration No. 5. Berlin: Frei Universität Berlin. 
Saldias, O., 2010. Networks, courts and regional integration: Explaining the 
establishment of the Andean Court of Justice. Working Paper of the KFG The 
Transformative Power of Europe, (No. 20 November 2010) Available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708040. 
Schmitter, P., 1970. A revised theory of European integration. 24 (4), 836-868. 
Stein, E., 1981. Lawyers, judges and the making of a transnational constitution. 
American Journal of International Law, 75 (1), 1-27. 
Stone Sweet, A., 1999. Judicialization and the construction of governance. 
Comparative Political Studies, 32 (2), 147-184. 
Stone Sweet, A., 2004. The judicial construction of europe. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stone Sweet, A., 2010. How the European legal system works and does not work. 
Social Science Research Network. 
Tallberg, J., 2003. European governance and supranational institutions: Making 
states comply London: Routledge. 
Thomas, L.W., 1973. The Colombian Supreme Court decision on the Andean foreign 
investment code and its implications for the law of treaties. Journal of 
International Law and Economics, 8, 113-128. 
Van Der Mei, A.P., 2009. The East African Community: The bumpy road to 
supranationalism. Maastricht: Maastricht Working Papers Faculty of Law. 
Vargas-Hidalgo, R., 1979. The crisis of the Andean Pact: Lessons for integration 
among developing countries. Journal of Common Market Studies, 27 (3), 213-
226. 
Watson, A., 1976. Legal transplants and law reform. Law Quarterly Review, 92, 79. 
Weiler, J., 1991. The transformation of Europe. Yale Law Journal, 100, 2403-2483. 
Williamson, J., 1990. What washington means by policy reform. In Williamson, J. 
ed. Latin american adjustment: How much has happened. Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics. 
Wionczek, M.S., 1970. The rise and the decline of latin america economic 
integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 9, 49-66. 
